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Abstract
In this paper we consider the implications of habits for optimal monetary policy,
when those habits either exist at the level of the aggregate basket of consumption
goods (supercialhabits) or at the level of individual goods (deephabits: see Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). External habits generate an additional distortion
in the economy and create new trade-o¤s for optimal policy, as the policy maker does
not respond as aggressively to technology shocks in order to avoid exacerbating the
habits externality. This can dramatically a¤ect both the parameterization of optimal
simple rules, as well as their determinacy properties. These e¤ects are particularly
strong when habits are of the deep kind.
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1 Introduction
Within the benchmark New Keynesian analysis of monetary policy (see, for example,
Woodford (2003)), monetary policy typically inuences the economy through the impact
of interest rates on a representative households intertemporal consumption decision. It
has often been felt that the purely forward-looking consumption dynamics that such basic
intertemporal consumption decisions imply, are unable to capture the hump-shaped out-
put response to changes in monetary policy one typically nds in the data. As a means of
accounting for such patterns, some authors have augmented the benchmark model with
various forms of habits e¤ects in consumption. The habits e¤ects can either be inter-
nal (see for example, Fuhrer (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Leith
and Malley (2005)) or external (see, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007)), the latter
reecting a catching up with the Joneses e¤ect whereby households fail to internalize
the externality their own consumption causes on the utility of other households. Both
forms of habits behavior can help the New Keynesian monetary policy model capture the
persistence found in the data (see, for example Kozicki and Tinsley (2002)), although
the policy implications are likely to be di¤erent. More recently, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe (2006) o¤er an alternative form of habits behavior, which they label deep.
Deep habits occur at the level of individual goods rather than at the level of an aggre-
gate consumption basket (supercialhabits). While this distinction does not a¤ect the
dynamic description of aggregate consumption behavior relative to the case of supercial
habits, it does render the individual rmspricing decisions intertemporal and, in the
exible price economy considered by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006), can pro-
duce a counter-cyclical mark-up which signicantly a¤ects the responses of key aggregates
to shocks. Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2010) then extend the analysis of
deep habits to a sticky-price environment and nd that such a model is able to explain,
with moderate degrees of price stickiness and plausible policy rules, the prices puzzle and
ination persistence.1
While the focus of the papers listed above is on the dynamic response of economies
which feature some form of habits, they do not consider the implications for optimal
policy of such an extension. In contrast, Amato and Laubach (2004) consider optimal
monetary policy in a sticky-price New Keynesian economy which has been augmented
to include internal (but supercial) habits. Since the form of habits is internal (house-
holds care about their consumption relative to their own past consumption, rather than
the consumption of other households), there is no additional externality associated with
consumption habits themselves, and, given an e¢ cient steady-state, the exible price
equilibrium in the neighborhood of that steady-state remains e¢ cient. Accordingly, as
in the benchmark New Keynesian model, there is no trade-o¤ between output gap and
ination stabilization in the face of technology shocks and interesting policy trade-o¤s
1 It should be noted that Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2010) do not consider the optimal
policy or determinacy issues that are the focus of this paper.
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require the introduction of additional ine¢ ciencies (such as mark-up shocks or a desire
for interest rate smoothing, perhaps due to worries over the zero lower bound in nominal
interest rates).
In this paper, we extend the benchmark sticky-price New Keynesian economy to in-
clude external habits in consumption, where these habits can be either supercial or deep.2
The focus on external habits implies that there is an externality associated with uctua-
tions in consumption and that the exible price equilibrium will not usually be e¢ cient,
thereby creating an additional trade-o¤ for optimal policy. Essentially, policy makers do
not respond to technology shocks as aggressively as they would in the absence of a habits
externality, as they wish to avoid exacerbating that externality. This is particularly so in
the case of deep habits, where monetary policy a¤ects the rmsdiscounted prots and
thereby their optimal intertemporal markup. In the face of a positive technology shock,
the typical monetary policy response of cutting real interest rates induces the rms pro-
ducing the goods over which consumers form deep habits to cut markups and encourage
consumers to consume more than is socially desirable. The loose monetary policy will
then be more muted. When we lower the ination target, we nd that the policy makers
concern over the zero lower bound for nominal interests will further reduce the monetary
policy response to the same shock. There are also stabilization biases associated with
the time-consistent discretionary policy, which not only fails to achieve the price level
control observed under commitment, but also fails to mitigate the formation of socially
undesirable habits to the same extent as optimal commitment policy.
In addition to examining optimal policy, we also consider how the presence of habits
a¤ects the conduct of policy through simple rules. We nd that the introduction of deep
habits can induce problems of indeterminacy, as the tightening of monetary policy can
induce ination through variations in mark-up behavior, such that an interest rate rule
which satises the Taylor principle (where nominal interest rates rise more than one for
one with increases in ination above target) may not be su¢ cient to ensure determinacy of
the local equilibrium. We also nd that optimal simple rules can come close to mimicking
the commitment solution, even if we constrain the rule parameters to lie in a plausible
range and avoid the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. Moreover, as the extent
of habits are increased, the optimal rule focuses less on stabilizing ination and more
on eliminating the habits externality and this trade-o¤ is reected in the optimized rule
parameters.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section we outline our model with deep
and supercial habits. In section 3, we consider optimal policy under both commitment
and discretion, where the policy-makers objective function is derived from a second order
approximation to householdsutility. In section 4, we turn to our analysis of simple rules,
considering both their determinacy properties and, for rules which can ensure determinacy,
their ability to mimic optimal policy. Section 5 summarizes the welfare results, and Section
2Throughout the paper, we also contrast external habits with internal habits, although the latter
requires additional distortions to make the policy problem interesting.
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6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, a monopolistically competitive production sec-
tor, and the government. There is a continuum of goods that enter the householdscon-
sumption basket. Households can either form external consumption habits at the level of
each individual good in their basket, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) call this type
of habits deep, or they can form habits at the level of the consumption basket as a whole-
supercialhabits. Throughout the paper, we use the same terminology. Furthermore,
we assume the economy is subject to price inertia. We shall derive a general model, and
note when assuming supercial or deep habits alters the behavioral equations. In section
3, we also outline the key features of an economy with internal habits in consumption.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure
1. Households derive utility from consumption of a composite good and disutility from
hours spent working.
Deep Habits When habits are of the deep kind, each households consumption basket,
Xkt , is an aggregate of a continuum of habit-adjusted goods, indexed by i and of measure
1,
Xkt =
Z 1
0

Ckit   Cit 1
  1

di
 
 1
;
where Ckit is household ks consumption of good i and Cit 
R 1
0 C
k
itdk denotes the cross-
sectional average consumption of this good.  is the elasticity of substitution between
habit-adjusted goods ( > 1), while the parameter  measures the degree of external habit
formation in the consumption of each individual good i. Setting  to 0 returns us to the
usual case of no habits.
The composition of the consumption basket is chosen in order to minimize expendi-
tures, and the demand for good i is
Ckit =

Pit
Pt
 
Xkt + Cit 1; 8i
where Pt represents the overall price index, dened as an average of all goods prices,
Pt 
R 1
0 P
1 
it di
1=(1 )
. Aggregating across households yields the total demand for
good i, i 2 [0; 1] ;
Cit =

Pit
Pt
 
Xt + Cit 1: (1)
Due to the presence of deep habits, this demand is dynamic in nature, as it depends not
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only on current period elements but also on the lagged value of consumption. This, in
turn, will a¤ect the pricing/output decisions of the rms producing these goods, as shown
below.
Supercial Habits Habits are supercial when they are formed at the level of the
aggregate consumption good. Households derive utility from the habit-adjusted composite
good Xkt ,
Xkt = C
k
t   Ct 1;
where household ks consumption, Ckt ; is an aggregate of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] ;
Ckt =
Z 1
0

Ckit
  1

di
 
 1
;
with  the elasticity of substitution between them and Ct 1 
R 1
0 C
k
t 1dk the cross-
sectional average of consumption.
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimize expendi-
tures and the demand for individual good i is
Ckit =

Pit
Pt
 
Ckt =

Pit
Pt
  
Xkt + Ct 1

:
By aggregating across all households, we obtain the overall demand for good i as
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk =

Pit
Pt
 
Ct: (2)
Unlike the case of deep habits, this demand is not dynamic.
Remainder of the Households Problem The remainder of the households problem
is the same irrespective of whether or not habits are deep or supercial. Specically,
households choose the habit-adjusted consumption aggregate, Xkt , hours worked, N
k
t ,
and the portfolio allocation, Dkt+1, to maximize expected lifetime utility
E0
1X
t=0
t
" 
Xkt
1 
1    
 
Nkt
1+
1 + 
#
subject to the budget constraintZ 1
0
PitC
k
itdi+ EtQt;t+1D
k
t+1 =WtN
k
t (1  ) +Dkt +t + Tt (3)
and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t,  is the discount factor (0 <  < 1) ; and  and 
are the inverses of the intertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work
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(;  > 0;  6= 1). The households period-t income includes: wage income from providing
labor services to goods producing rms, WtNkt , which is subject to a constant tax rate,  ,
dividends from the monopolistically competitive rms, t, and payments on the portfolio
of assets, Dkt . Financial markets are complete and Qt;t+1 is the one-period stochastic
discount factor for nominal payo¤s. Tt are lump-sum transfers received from the gov-
ernment. In the maximization problem, households take as given the processes for Ct 1,
Wt, t, and Tt, as well as the initial asset position Dk 1. The tax rate,  , will be used
to nance lump-sum transfers, and is designed to ensure that the long-run equilibrium is
e¢ cient in the presence of the habits externality.
The rst order conditions for labor and habit-adjusted consumption are 
Nkt
 
Xkt
  = wt(1  )
and
Qt;t+1 = 
 
Xkt+1
Xkt
! 
Pt
Pt+1
; (4)
where wt  WtPt is the real wage (see Appendix A for further details). The Euler equation
for consumption can be written as
1 = Et
" 
Xkt+1
Xkt
! 
Pt
Pt+1
#
Rt;
where R 1t = Et [Qt;t+1] denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate
between periods t and t+ 1.
2.2 Firms
In this subsection we consider the behavior of rms, which are monopolistically competi-
tive and subject to nominal inertia in the form of quadratic price adjustment costs as in
Rotemberg (1982).3 There is a continuum of such rms, indexed by i and of measure 1.
Each rm i produces a unique good using only labor as input in the production process
Yit = AtNit: (5)
Total factor productivity, At; a¤ects all rms symmetrically and follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnAt =  lnAt 1 + "t, with persistence parameter  2 (0; 1) and
random shocks "t  iidN
 
0; 2A

. Firms choose the amount of labor that minimizes
production costs, WtNit. The minimization problem gives a demand for labor, Nit = YitAt ;
and a nominal marginal cost, MCt = WtAt ; which is the same across rms. (See Appendix
A for more details.)
3For a version of the model where nominal inertia is in the form of Calvo (1983) contracts, see Leith,
Moldovan, and Rossi (2009).
6
Firms can reset prices in every period but, in doing so, they must pay a cost of price
adjustment, expressed in terms of the produced good as
'
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
Yt
where '  0 measures the magnitude of the price adjustment costs and   1 is the gross
steady state ination rate. Nominal prots are then dened as:
it = (Pit  MCt)Yit   Pt
"
'
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
Yt
#
:
Deep Habits When habits are deep, rms face the dynamic demand from households,
given by expression (1), where the choice of price a¤ects market share and future prots.
Firms then choose processes for Yit and Pit to maximize the present discounted value
of expected future prots, Et
1X
s=0
Qt;t+sit+s, subject to this dynamic demand and the
constraint that Cit = Yit. Qt;t+s is the s-step ahead equivalent of the one-period stochastic
discount factor in (4). The rst order conditions for Yit and Pit are
vit = (Pit  MCt) + Et [Qt;t+1vit+1] (6)
and
Yit = vit
"


Pit
Pt
  1 Xt
Pt
#
+'

Pit
Pit 1
  1

PtYt
Pit 1
  EtQt;t+1

Pit+1
Pit
  1

Pit+1
 (Pit)
2Pt+1Yt+1

(7)
where the Lagrange multiplier vit represents the shadow price of producing an addi-
tional unit of good i. This shadow value equals the marginal benet of additional prots,
(Pit  MCt), plus the discounted expected payo¤s from higher future sales, Et [Qt;t+1vit+1].
Due to the presence of habits in consumption, increasing output by one unit in the current
period leads to an increase in sales of  in the next period. In the absence of habits, when
 = 0, the intertemporal e¤ects of higher output disappear and the shadow price simply
equals time-t prots. The other rst order condition in equation (7) says that an increase
in price brings additional revenues, Yit, while simultaneously causing a decline in demand,
given by the rst term in square brackets and valued at the shadow value vit, to which we
must add the net e¤ect of price changes on current and expected future price adjustment
costs.4
Supercial Habits Under supercial habits, rms face a typical static demand as given
in equation (2). However, the nature of the price adjustment costs still renders the prot
maximization problem dynamic. Firms are thus choosing prices to maximize the present
4An increase in price will raise price adjustment costs in the current period but lower them in the
future.
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discounted value of future prots, subject to the demand for their good and under the
restriction that all demand be satised at the chosen price. The optimal price is set so as
to balance the marginal benet of additional revenues with the marginal cost of reduced
demand and of increased net price adjustment costs:
Yit =  (Pit  MCt)

Pit
Pt
  1 Yt
Pt
+'

Pit
Pit 1
  1

PtYt
Pit 1
  EtQt;t+1

Pit+1
Pit
  1

Pit+1
P 2it
Pt+1Yt+1

2.3 The Government
The government collects labor income taxes which it rebates to households as transfers.
There is no government spending per se. The government budget constraint is given by
WtNt = Tt: (8)
In this cashless economy, monetary policy is conducted in optimal fashion, with the
nominal interest rate being the central banks policy instrument. However, we also con-
sider the consequences of the central bank adopting more simple forms of policy, such as
Taylor-type interest rate rules, and explore how closely these simple policy rules come to
the optimal.
2.4 Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, the dynamics of the economy are characterized by the fol-
lowing set of equations:
Consumers:
Xt = Ct   Ct 1 (9)
Nt
X t
= wt(1  ) (10)
X t = Et

X t+1
Rt
t+1

(11)
Government:
WtNt = Tt (12)
Firms:
Yt = AtNt (13)
mct =
wt
At
(14)
lnAt =  lnAt 1 + "t (15)
Subject to quadratic price adjustment costs, the rmschoice of price under supercial
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habits is
1  

1  1
t

Yt = '
t

  1
 t

Yt   'Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
  t+1

  1
 t+1

Yt+1
#
:
(16)
In contrast, when habits are deep and rms face a dynamic demand curve for their
product, the price setting behavior is described by the following two equations (where we
have written the shadow price of production in real terms, i.e. !t  vtPt ),
!t =

1  1
t

+ Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
 
!t+1
#
(17)
Yt = !tXt + '
t

  1
 t

Yt   'Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
  t+1

  1
 t+1

Yt+1
#
(18)
In both cases, the markup is the inverse of the real marginal cost,
t =
1
mct
: (19)
To these equations, we add the aggregate resource constraint (obtained by combining
the aggregate version of the households budget constraint (3) with the government budget
constraint (8) and the denition of aggregate prots, t = PtYt WtNt  '2
 
t
   1
2
PtYt)
Yt = Ct +
'
2
t

  1
2
Yt (20)
and the monetary policy specication (detailed in Sections 3 and 4 below).
2.5 Solution Method and Model Calibration
In the absence of a closed-form solution, the models equilibrium conditions are log-
linearized around the e¢ cient deterministic steady state. The e¢ ciency of the steady
state, obtained through the tax on labor income, allows us to obtain an accurate expression
for welfare involving only second-order terms and implies that we can compare welfare
across di¤erent types of habits without results being a¤ected by variations in the steady-
state mark-up.
In order to solve the model, we must select numerical values for some key structural
parameters. Table 1 reports our choices, which are similar to those of other studies using
a New Keynesian economy with habits in consumption. The model is calibrated to a
quarterly frequency. We assume an annual real rate of interest of 4%, which implies
a discount factor  of 0:9902. The risk aversion parameter  is set at 2.0, while 
equals 0.25.5 Consistent with the empirical evidence, the degree of market power is
5 is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. While micro estimates of this elasticity are rather
small, they tend not to t well in macro models. Here, we follow the macroeconomic literature and choose
a larger value of 4.0.
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Parameter Value Description
1= (1.04)1=4 Real interest rate
 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
Nw 4.0 Frisch labor supply elasticity
 11.0 Elasticity of substitution between goods
' 100 Price adjustment cost parameter
 0.6 Degree of habit formation
 (1:036)1=4 Gross ination rate
 0.78 Persistence of technology
A 0.021 Standard deviation of technology process
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
1:1. The steady state value of the markup in the case of internal or supercial habits
is  =

1  1
 1
, while in the case of deep habits is given as,  =
h
1  (1 )(1 )
i 1
, and
depends on both the elasticity of substitution between nal goods  and the degree of
habit formation . However, the impact of  on the markup, ; is small and we therefore
set  = 11 across all model variants, implying a steady-state mark-up of 10% in the case
of internal or external supercial habits, and 10:16% in the case of deep habits for our
benchmark calibration. For the habits formation parameter , we use a benchmark value
of 0:6, which falls within the range of estimates identied in the literature.6 However, we
allow  to vary in the [0; 1) interval as we conduct a sensitivity analysis of our results.
We also set the income tax rate  so as to ensure an e¢ cient steady state. In the case
of deep or supercial habits a labor income tax of,  = 1    (1  ), ensures that the
steady-state replicates the social planners allocation, by compensating for the net e¤ect
of the habits externality and the distortion due to imperfect competition. In the case
of internal habits it is only necessary to compensate for the steady-state distortion due
to imperfect competition since there is no longer any habits externality and the subsidy
is given by,  = 1   . Accordingly, for our benchmark calibration, the income tax is
55% in the case of deep and supercial external habits and -10% in the case of internal
habits. In other words our benchmark calibration actually requires the use of a tax to
replicate the social planners allocation in steady state as the habits externality dominates
the imperfect competition distortion.7 The use of this time invariant tax/subsidy implies
the steady-state is the same across habits variants facilitating welfare comparisons.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), we calibrate the parameters of the tech-
nology process (; A) and the parameters of a simple Taylor-type monetary policy rule
to match the persistence and standard deviations of output and ination in the U.S.
6Macro-based estimates of habits formation of the supercial type range from 0.59 as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) to very high values of 0.98 as reported by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005).
For the deep type of habits, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe,
and Uuskula (2010) give a value of 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. Micro-based estimates (see, for example,
Ravina (2007)) are substantially lower, with a range of 0.29-0.5.
7The balancing of the two distortions is used as a device by Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse (2008) to
achieve an e¢ cient steady-state while avoiding the need to introduce a steady-state subsidy often found
in New Keynesian analyses of optimal monetary policy.
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data, over the period 1960:Q1-2010:Q4. Ination is measured as the percent change in
the implicit GDP deator. We obtain a persistence parameter  = 0:78 and a standard
deviation A = 0:021. Finally, as a benchmark we set the steady state level of ination
at the data average of 3.57% (annual rate).8
2.6 Log-linear Representation
Upon log-linearizing and combining the relevant equilibrium conditions, we obtain a sys-
tem of equations which characterize the dynamics of the economy in the neighborhood
of the e¢ cient steady state. Firstly, we have the IS curve in terms of habit-adjusted
consumption, bXt = Et bXt+1   1

bRt + 1

Etbt+1: (21)
Then, when habits are of the deep kind, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is
given by bt = Etbt+1 + 1
'
bYt   b!t   bXt ; (22)
where the shadow value of production b!t behaves according to the following relationship
b!t = 1
!
bt + Etb!t+1 +   bXt   Et bXt+1 ; (23)
and the markup is inversely related to the real marginal cost,
bt =  cmct; (24)
which is given by, cmct =  bXt + bYt   (1 + ) bAt: (25)
Under supercial habits, the NKPC takes the more familiar form,
bt = Etbt+1 +    1
'
cmct
with the same denition of marginal costs (25). Finally, we have the expression dening
habit-adjusted consumption bXt,
bXt = 1
1  
bYt   bYt 1 : (26)
3 Optimal Policy
In this section, we consider the nature of optimal monetary policy in response to technol-
ogy shocks, under both cases of commitment and discretion by the monetary authority.
8 In Section 3.4 below, we consider the implications for optimal policy of an alternative long-run ination
level (or target) of 2% (at an annual rate).
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The central banks objective function is given by a second order approximation to the
representative householdsutility, written in gapform as (see Appendix F for details)
 0 =  1
2
N
1+
E0
1X
t=0
t

 (1  )
1  
 bXt   bXt 2 +  bYt   bY t 2 + 'b2t+ tip+O[2]:
(27)
The gap variables are dened as deviations of the decentralized equilibrium allocation
from that which would be implemented by a benevolent social planner (see appendix E
for the social planners problem). We note that this welfare measure has the same basic
elements (output and ination) as the benchmark New Keynesian model, but the output
gapcomponent is more complex, reecting the presence of habits formation e¤ects. This
objective function applies whether or not habits are deep, supercial or internal.
In considering alternative policies, we measure the welfare cost of a particular policy
A as the fraction of the consumption path under the Ramsey allocation that must be
given up in order to equalize welfare under the two types of policy, E
1P
t=0
tu
 
XAt ; N
A
t

=
E
1P
t=0
tu
 
(1  )XRt ; NRt

, where theR superscript denotes the Ramsey allocation. Given
the utility function adopted, the expression for  in percentage terms is
 =
"
1 

WA  WRN
WRX
 1
1 
#
 100 (28)
where WA represents the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the economy
under monetary policy A, WA  E
1P
t=0
tu
 
XAt ; N
A
t

, while WRX and W
R
N are welfare
components associated with the economy under the full commitment policy, WRX =
E
1P
t=0
t
(XRt )
1 
1  and W
R
N =  E
1P
t=0
t
(NRt )
1+
1+ :
3.1 Internal Habits
To better understand the e¤ects of external habits formation on the optimal conduct of
monetary policy, we contrast this environment with the case when habits are internal to
the householdsdecision making process.9 When habits are internal, each households
habits-adjusted consumption is given by,
Xkt = C
k
t   Ckt 1;
where the reference level of consumption, Ckt 1, is now that of the individual household
rather than the average of all households.
Anticipating that current consumption decisions a¤ect the stock of habits entering
9This is the case considered in Amato and Laubach (2004). A more detailed comparison of our results
with those in Amato and Laubach (2004) is included in Section 3.4 below.
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into the future, the consumption Euler equation is given by,
X t   EtX t+1 = Et
 
X t+1   Et+1X t+2
 Rt
t+1

and the labor supply condition by
(Nt)
 
X t   EtX t+1
 = wt(1  ):
These log-linearize as,
bXt   Et bXt+1 = Et  bXt+1   Et+1 bXt+2  1  

 bRt   Etbt+1
and
N^t +

1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1 = w^t
The stochastic discount factor used by rms to discount prots, Qt;t+s = s

X t+s Et+sX t+s+1
X t  EtX t+1

Pt
Pt+s
;
di¤ers from the other denitions of habits, but the e¤ects of this are eliminated in the
log-linearization. As a result, the NKPC and the rest of the model are the same as in the
case of (supercial) external habits,
bt = Etbt+1 +    1
'
cmct;
although the denition of marginal costs is a¤ected by the change in the labor supply
condition under internal habits. In gap form, this can be written as:
cmct = bwt   bAt (29)
=

1  
h bXt   bXt   Et  bXt+1   bXt+1i+  bYt   bY t  :
3.1.1 The trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilization
The absence of a trade-o¤between output stabilization and ination in the case of internal
habits can be seen by considering the objective function, (27). If we imagine a policy
maker who was unconcerned with ination such that the NKPC ceased to be a constraint
on their actions, then they would seek to minimize,
1
2
N
1+
E0
1X
t=0
t

 (1  )
1  
 bXt   bXt 2 +  bYt   bY t 2 (30)
by varying interest rates to inuence consumption decisions, subject to the denition of
habits adjusted consumption,
bXt   bXt = 11   hbYt   bY t    bYt 1   bY t 1i
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implying the following rst order condition,

1  
h bXt   bXt   Et  bXt+1   bXt+1i+  bYt   bY t  = 0 (31)
This rst order condition, in conjunction with the rest of description of the economy,
will determine the optimal path of output and consumption for a policy maker uncon-
cerned with ination. However, from the log-linearized denition of marginal costs under
internal habits, (29), we see that this implies that cmct = 0 and this optimal path for
output/consumption has no inationary repercussions. In other words, under internal
habits, the policy maker can implement their preferred output/consumption path with-
out su¤ering any inationary repercussions. (This is shown formally for the full policy
problem in Appendix D).10
This is not true of the external forms of habits, since the households consump-
tion/labor supply decisions do not internalize the consumption externality, such that
the policy maker faces a trade-o¤ in stabilizing ination and the habits externality. This
can be seen by examining the forcing variable in the NKPC under either supercial (25)
or deep (22)-(25) external habits, where the path for output/consumption implied by (31)
will not generally be consistent with zero ination, such that the policy maker who cares
about ination faces a trade-o¤ in minimizing ination variability around its target and
o¤setting the consumption externality.
3.2 Optimal Policy under Commitment
If the monetary authority can credibly commit to following its policy plans, it then chooses
the policy that maximizes householdswelfare subject to the private sectors optimal be-
havior, as summarized in equations (21) - (26), and given the exogenous process for
technology (see Appendix G for details of the policy problem under commitment). We
analyze the implications of this policy in terms of impulse responses to exogenous tech-
nology shocks.
Optimal policy faces a trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilization in the face
of technology shocks, which would not be present with internal habits. As noted above,
with internal habits, policy would be loosened to ensure the exible price equilibrium
was recreated without generating any ination. This is illustrated by the dotted impulse
responses in Figure 1.11 However, when habits are external, such that one household
does not take account of the impact their increased consumption has on the utility of
others, then with only one policy instrument available, the monetary authority cannot
10 If, however, as in Amato and Laubach (2004), the policy maker is constrained in their ability to change
interest rates, due to, for example, a desire to smooth interest rates, then the policy maker will be unable
to replicate the exible price allocation, even if habits are internal. We consider this case in Section 3.4
below.
11Of course, this is also the case in the New Keynesian model without habits - in the face of technology
shocks, the monetary policy maker can eliminate the output gap without generating ination.
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simultaneously ensure output is at its e¢ cient level and ination is eliminated. Instead,
while nominal inertia points to a relaxation of policy in the face of a positive technology
shock to boost output, the consumption externality suggests that the higher consumption
this entails need not be desirable.12 The solid lines in Figure 1 show that, when habits
are supercial, the optimal response of the economy to a positive persistent technology
shock is a positive output gap and an initial decline followed by an increase in ination.
To achieve this outcome, the monetary authority reduces the nominal interest rate to
boost demand to the socially optimal level. Because the policy is expansionary, we can
implicitly say that the ine¢ ciency due to price stickiness is dominating in this case.
We turn to the case of deep habits, illustrated by the dashed impulse responses in
Figure 1. Holding the monetary policy response constant, we would expect the slackening
of monetary policy to increase the discounted prots of rms, encouraging them to cut
current markups, generating consumption habits in their goods and thereby widening
the output gap further. In other words the trade-o¤ implied by the habits externality is
more pronounced in the case of deep habits, as a result of rmsdesire to intertemporally
manipulate mark-ups. Consequently, the optimal monetary response does not slacken
real interest rates by as much in order to discourage the reduction in mark-ups. As the
degree of importance of habits increases, the relaxation of policy is signicantly reduced as
policy makers seek to dampen the initial rise in consumption which imposes an undesirable
externality on households. This can be seen in Figure 2, where the dashed lines depict
impulse responses under the benchmark value of deep habits ( = 0:6) and circles the
responses under an alternative higher value of  = 0:8:
3.3 Optimal Policy with Discretion
The previous sub-section examined policy under commitment. It is well known that
not being able to commit to a time-inconsistent policy can give rise to a stabilization
bias in the New Keynesian economy, whereby policy makers cannot obtain the most
favorable trade-o¤s between output gap and ination stabilization.13 In our economy
with a consumption externality, there may be additional sources of stabilization bias
which make it interesting to assess the importance of having access to a commitment
technology. Appendix G denes the inputs to the iterative algorithm used to compute
time-consistent policy in Soderlind (1999).
Figure 3 contrasts policy under discretion and commitment when habits are super-
cial. Aside from failing to exploit the expectational benets of price level control, the
discretionary policy also fails to achieve the initial relative tightening of policy which
mitigates the generation of undesirable habits e¤ects. The desirability of undertaking the
commitment policy emerges in the signicantly di¤erent paths for ination across com-
12Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show how contractionary tax policy can be used for the purpose of
aligning output with the e¢ cient level in response to technology shocks.
13 It should be noted that the stabilization bias can exist in economies which do not contain steady-state
distortions, and are therefore not subject to the familiar ination bias.
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mitment and discretion. The welfare cost of not being able to commit to future policies
amounts to 0:00069% of consumption levels under commitment, in the benchmark case
of  = 0:6.14
When we undertake the same comparison in the case of deep habits (see Figure 4),
the time inconsistency problem is even more signicant than in the case of supercial
habits. This is because under deep habits there is a stronger desire to tighten policy
initially in order to prevent an undesirable increase in consumption habits, exacerbated
by the prot-maximizing cuts in mark-ups by goods producing rms. Since such a policy
is designed to improve policy trade-o¤s in the future, it is not possible to engineer such
a monetary tightening under time consistent policy. The costs of not having access to a
commitment technology are correspondingly higher under deep habits, where the welfare
costs of discretion are 0.0047% of the consumption levels under the Ramsey policy, for
the benchmark degree of habits.
3.4 Alternative Ination Target
In our benchmark calibration, steady-state ination was set to be consistent with observed
(annualized) ination in the U.S. over the period 1960:Q1-2010:Q4 of 3.57%. At this rate
of ination, optimal policy does not generally breach the zero lower bound (ZLB) for
nominal interest rates, in the sense that twice the standard deviation of the nominal
interest rate is less than the steady-state nominal interest rate, so that we would not
expect to reach the ZLB at least 97.5% of the time.15 However, if we lower the ination
target to 2% along the lines of many central banksobjectives, then the ZLB can become
an issue. In this case, the policy maker faces additional trade-o¤s between the desire to
stabilize ination, the need to respect the ZLB and the wish to o¤set any externality in
habits formation.
In order to account for the ZLB, we follow Amato and Laubach (2004) and add a
quadratic term in the deviation of the nominal interest rate from steady-state to the
policy makers objective function. The weight attached to this term is su¢ cient to ensure
that, under the optimal policy, the ZLB is respected with 97.5% probability. The impulse
responses under the three types of habits formation are given in Figure 5. The rst line
shows the impulse response under internal habits with and without a concern for the ZLB.
The rst thing to note is that, as in Amato and Laubach (2004), there is now a meaningful
policy trade-o¤ even when habits are internal and policy makers wish to avoid the ZLB, as
policy makers moderate their response to the technology shock. Given the expectational
benets of returning the price level to base following shocks, the inationary e¤ects of
14The welfare results across all experiments are collected together in Table 2, which is discussed in
Section 5.
15We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) in assessing the likelihood of a breach of the ZLB in this
way. The one case in which the zero lower bound may be a problem more often than our self-imposed
limit of 2.5% is the case of discretionary policy when habits are deep, where we may meet the zero lower
bound with a probability of 0.0281. At 3.57% steady-state ination, all other policies are comfortably
clear of the ZLB.
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the moderation of monetary policy are subsequently undone. The second row of Figure 5
reveals a similar pattern for supercial habits. While in the case of deep habits, the third
row, the monetary policy response to technology shocks is already muted by the desire
to moderate the accumulation of socially undesirable habits, such that there is no ZLB
problem even when the ination target is reduced to 2%.
Interestingly, when we turn to time-consistent discretionary policy, adding a desire to
smooth interest rates as in Amato and Laubach (2004) does not resolve the ZLB problem
as policy makers are forced to use large initial interest rate movements, as they cannot
commit to an ongoing sustained interest rate response to the shock.
In terms of welfare, we nd that, for internal habits, accounting for the ZLB problem
within the commitment policy raises the costs of shocks to 0.00037% of the level of
consumption under the Ramsey policy, while for supercial habits the corresponding
increase is smaller, at 8.26E-05%. While in the case of deep habits, as noted above, there
is no ZLB problem. Accordingly, the muting of the policy response to technology shocks
as a result of the habits externality is qualitatively similar in nature to the moderation
policy makers undertake when faced with a ZLB problem.
4 Simple Rules
Having derived the optimal policy under commitment and discretion for our new Keyne-
sian economy with either supercial or deep habits, we now turn to consider the following
simple monetary policy rule, akin to that of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007),
bRt = bt + y bYt + R bRt 1;
where bRt is the nominal interest rate, bt is the rate of ination and bYt is the current
(observable) level of output. We begin by considering the determinacy properties of our
simple rule, under the three forms of habits formation. We then turn to consider the
welfare maximizing parameterization of the rule, and assessing to what extent this can
mimic the optimal policy under commitment described above.
Figure 6 details the determinacy properties of this rule when habits are of the super-
cial form. Each sub-plot details the combinations of  and y which ensure determinacy
(light grey dots), indeterminacy (blanks) and instability (dark grey stars).16 Moving from
left to right across subplots increases the degree of interest rate inertia in the rule, R,
while moving down the page increases the extent of habits formation, . Consider the
16Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), we write the dynamic model in matrix form as AEtxt+1 = Bxt
where xt is an n1 vector of the models endogenous and exogenous variables. A and B are square matrices
of size n n: Let us dene J = A 1B; m as the number of non-predetermined variables in x, n m the
number of predetermined variables in x; and q the number of eigenvalues of J that are greater than one
in absolute value, i.e. explosive eigenvalues. If q = m; the system is determinate (determinacy). In other
words the solution to AEtxt+1 = Bxt is unique and converges to the steady state. If q < m there are an
innite number of solutions to AEtxt+1 = Bxt, the system is therefore indeterminate (indeterminacy).
Ultimately, if q > m there is no solution to AEtxt+1 = Bxt and the system is unstable (instability).
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rst sub-plot in the top left hand corner with R = 0 and  = 0, which re-states the sta-
bility properties of the original Taylor rule. Here the importance of the Taylor principle is
revealed as  > 1 in combination with a non-negative response to output is a su¢ cient
condition for determinacy. Within this region, there is limited scope for compensating for
failing to full the Taylor principle through increasing the positive response of the interest
rate to output, and there is slightly greater scope for using a more aggressive monetary
policy response to compensate for a mildly negative interest rate response to output. It is
also interesting to note that a second region of determinacy exists where the interest rate
rule fails to satisfy the Taylor principle, such that  < 1, and the response to output is
strongly negative. This region is not often discussed in the literature, but is mentioned
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Typically, when monetary policy fails to satisfy the
Taylor principle, ination can be driven by self-fullling expectations which are validated
by monetary policy. However, when the output response is su¢ ciently negative there is
an additional destabilizing element in policy, which overturns the excessive stability gen-
erated by a passive monetary policy, implying a unique saddlepath where any deviation
from that saddlepath will imply an explosive path for ination.
As we move down the sub-plots in the rst column of Figure 6 we increase the degree
of supercial habits. This means that the output response to both policy and shocks is
more muted as current consumption is increasingly tied to past levels of consumption.
This has two e¤ects on the determinacy properties of the basic Taylor rule. Firstly, a rule
which satises the Taylor principle will do so even if the response to output is increasingly
negative. Secondly, the additional instability caused by adopting a negative interest rate
response to output becomes insu¢ cient to move a passive interest rate rule to a position
of determinacy. Accordingly, the importance of the Taylor principle is enhanced when
consumption is subject to supercial habits e¤ects.
As we move across the page from left to right we increase the extent of interest rate
inertia in the rule. In this case, as Woodford (2001) shows, the Taylor principle needs to
be rewritten in terms of the long-run interest rate response to excess ination, 1 R > 1:
As a result, the determinacy region in the positive quadrant spreads further into the
adjacent quadrants since a given level of instantaneous policy response to ination  has
a far greater long-run e¤ect.
Finally, when we combine supercial habits e¤ects with interest rate inertia, it becomes
possible to induce instability in our economy when the rule is passive, 1 R < 1, and the
interest rate response to output is negative, y < 0. Essentially, the slow evolution
of consumption under habits combined with interest rate inertia and a perverse policy
response to output and ination serves to induce a cumulative instability in the model.
Figure 7 constructs a similar set of sub-plots when habits are of the deep, rather
than supercial, kind. If the extent of habits formation is relatively low, the determinacy
properties of the model are similar to those observed under supercial habits. However, as
the degree of habits formation rises, then signicant di¤erences emerge. Firstly, the usual
determinacy region in the positive quadrant disappears and becomes indeterminate. This
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indeterminacy is linked to the additional dynamics that arise under deep habits formation,
when rms further adjust markups to account for market share. Suppose economic agents
expect an increase in ination. Given an active interest rate rule,  > 1, this will give rise
to a tightening of monetary policy. Typically, such a policy would lead to a contraction
in aggregate demand, invalidating the ination expectations. However, in the presence of
deep habits, the higher real interest rates will encourage rms to raise current mark-ups
as they discount the lost future sales such price increases would imply more heavily. If the
degree of habits e¤ects is su¢ ciently large, then this increase in mark-ups can validate the
initial increase in inationary expectations, leading to self-fullling inationary episodes
and indeterminacy.
Independently of this paper, Zubairy (2010) also considers the determinacy properties
of interest rate rules for a sticky price model featuring deep habits, but which, di¤erently
from the current paper, contains capital. Nevertheless, her ndings generally accord with
ours in nding that deep habits can generate determinacy issues which can be reduced
by responding to output and/or introducing interest rate inertia. She also nds that
writing the rules in terms of lagged rather than contemporaneous variables mitigates the
indeterminacy problem. One interesting di¤erence in our results to those of Zubairy (2010)
is that she nds that in a model with costless capital adjustment a stronger response to
ination in the interest rate rule can also reduce the indeterminacy problems associated
with deep habits. In our model without capital this e¤ect is not present and it would be
interesting in future research to reconcile these results in a model with capital adjustment
costs.
In the case of internal habits (see Appendix H), the results are very similar to those
under supercial external habits, with the key di¤erence that, because households are
more measured in their consumption response to shocks since they internalize the impact
of their behavior on habit formation, the regions of instability found under supercial
habits are reduced.
Optimal Simple Rules Having explored the determinacy properties of the simple
rule described above when embedded in our economy featuring either supercial or deep
habits, we now turn to consider the optimal parameterization of the rule in each case.17
In recognizing the desirability that our simple rule be also implementable, we restrict
the magnitude of the coe¢ cients  and y to be less than 5 in absolute value, while at
the same time ensuring that the rule satises a zero lower bound restriction. In order to
do so, when searching over the policy rule parameter space, we exclude any parameter
combination which results in a rule which implies that twice the standard deviation of
nominal interest rates is greater than the steady-state level of nominal interest rates. As
in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), this implies that our rule will not fall foul of the ZLB
17We search across the rule parameter space using the Simplex method employed by the Fminsearch
algorithm in Matlab (see, Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998)) in order to minimize the uncondi-
tional welfare losses associated with the rule.
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at least 97.5% of the time, and in practice our rules are even more robust to the ZLB
than this limit implies.
In the case of supercial habits and under the benchmark value of  = 0:6, the
optimal simple rule implies a moderate level of interest rate smoothing, with a strong
positive response to ination but a negative response to output ( = 5, y =  0:23, and
R = 0:49). With this type of optimal monetary policy rule, the economys response to a
technology shock essentially comes close to replicating the response obtained under a full
commitment policy, as shown in Figure 8 and discussed in Section 5 below. To explore the
intuition underpinning this result, Figure 9 shows how the optimal policy rule parameters
vary with the degree of habits formation. If we were to allow our rules to have the same
form, but to be unconstrained, then there is only a negligible di¤erence between the rules
performance and full commitment policy.18
In the absence of habits e¤ects, in a New Keynesian economy, a positive technology
shock leads to a decrease in ination and, due to the nominal inertia, an insu¢ ciently large
increase in output. Optimally, a decrease in the nominal interest rate stimulates demand
by reducing the real interest rate. This can be achieved by having a very large coe¢ cient
on ination relative to all other parameters, which essentially allows the simple policy rule
to achieve the ex-price equilibrium with a zero output gap and no additional ination.
As we introduce supercial habits e¤ects, in the face of the same shock households over-
consume and the output gap becomes positive suggesting that policy be tightened rather
than relaxed. This trade-o¤, which is not present in the model without external habits,
a¤ects the optimal parameterization of the simple policy rule. Specically, as we increase
the degree of habits formation, the optimal parameter on ination in the simple rule falls
and the extent of interest rate inertia increases. Furthermore, the negative coe¢ cient on
output also falls, eventually turning positive.
A key feature of optimal policy under commitment is price level control, where the
optimal policy achieves expectational benets in seeking to ensure that price level returns
to base following any shock. As the degree of supercial habits formation is increased,
this price level control can be achieved most e¤ectively through a combination of interest
rate inertia and output response. Consider the impact of the positive technology shock
depicted in Figure 8. Essentially, the rule is able to maintain a cut in real interest rates,
even when ination is slightly positive (to undo the price level e¤ects of the initial fall in
ination), by responding negatively to the persistent increase in output and maintaining
that stance for longer by increasing the amount of interest rate inertia. When the degree
of habits formation becomes su¢ ciently large, the coe¢ cient on output becomes positive
in order to reduce the initial relaxation of policy, and the degree of interest rate inertia is
increased to ensure price level control.
18The unconstrained optimal rule parameters across alternative levels of supercial and deep habits are
presented in Appendix H. Allowing the coe¢ cients on the rule to be unconstrained tends to imply that
the coe¢ cient on ination is signicantly higher, but decreasing in the level of habits, for the reasons
discussed in the main text.
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[Y ]  [] [R] Welfare cost ()
Internal Habits
Commitment 1.2037 0 3.7058 
ZLB Commitment 1.2008 0.1025 2.9526 0.00037
Supercial Habits
Commitment 1.5368 0.0862 3.2029 
Discretion 1.5352 0.1596 3.7159 0.00069
Strict Ination Targeting 1.5724 0 3.7066 0.00033
ZLB Commitment 1.5272 0.1181 2.9377 8.26E-05
Optimal rule 1.4778 0.2318 2.7250 0.00086
Deep Habits
Commitment 1.5169 0.1268 2.6743 
Discretion 1.4991 0.4052 3.9092 0.00466
Strict Ination Targeting 1.6450 0.0131 3.7500 0.00133
Optimal rule 1.4650 0.2029 2.5302 0.00035
Table 2: Standard deviations of selected variables and the welfare costs of technology
shocks.
Figure 10 plots the optimal parameters of the simple rule, when the economy features
an increasing level of deep habits formation.19 When habits are deep, there is less of a
desire to cut interest rates initially, to prevent rms cutting their mark-ups and generating
even greater consumption externalities. This implies that at high levels of deep habits,
there is a decline in the desire to stabilize ination and a greater concern with the habits
externality, which manifests itself as a reduction in the response to both ination and the
degree of interest rate inertia, as well as an increase in the response to output. Despite,
the simplicity of the rule and the constraints on the rules parameters, the simple rule in
all cases comes relatively close to achieving the welfare levels observed under commitment
- see Appendix H for an illustration of impulse responses to a technology shock under the
benchmark calibration of  = 0:6; where the ability of the rule to mimic commitment
policy is clear.
5 Welfare
Table 2 draws together the welfare costs of technology shocks across our various per-
mutations of policy and types of habit, where these costs are dened as the fraction of
consumption that must be given up in order to equate welfare in the stochastic economy
under alternative policies to that under Ramsey policies. We also report the standard
deviations of output, ination and interest rates in each case. We consider the case of
internal habits rst, where in the absence of a ZLB constraint, policy is perfectly able
to replicate the exible price equilibrium and eliminate ination volatility. Reducing the
ination target such that the ZLB becomes a concern, implies that policy cannot respond
19A similar plot for the case where the parameters of the rule are not constrained to be less than 5 is
presented in Appendix H.
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as aggressively to technology shocks so that the variability of ination rises, while that of
interest rates falls, and the welfare costs of the shock increase to 0.00037%. However, it
remains the case that optimal policy reduces ination volatility to a fraction of that ob-
served in the data (where the standard deviation of ination is 2.44% and that of output
1.54%).20
When we turn to external habits of the supercial kind, commitment policy materially
reduces the variability of ination relative to that found in the data, with little impact on
output variability. In the absence of an ability to commit, the policy maker over-stabilizes
output, and allows ination and interest rate volatility to rise relative to the commitment
case. This raises the welfare costs to 0.00069% of the level of consumption found under the
Ramsey policy. This tendency is aggravated when the policy maker faces a ZLB problem,
and the reduced responsiveness of policy to technology shocks lowers output volatility, but
raises ination variability with a corresponding deterioration in welfare. Similarly, simple
rules which are constrained in terms of the acceptable size of their coe¢ cients are not able
to stabilize ination as aggressively as full commitment policy, and tend to over-stabilize
output instead. However, a policy of strict ination targeting which e¤ectively ignores
the habits externality, is also damaging in welfare terms, as ination is stabilized at the
expense of output and interest rate volatility.
Finally, in the case of deep habits, under optimal policies there is a reduction in both
output and ination volatility relative to the data. An inability to commit leads to an
excessive stabilization of output, at the expense of the smallest reduction in ination
volatility relative to the data across any of our habits variants, for the reasons discussed
above. This implies a correspondingly high welfare cost of 0.0047% of Ramsey consump-
tion levels. Simple rules improve on the time-consistent solution, but are still slightly
limited in their ability to stabilize ination relative to the full commitment case. While a
policy of strict ination targeting (moderated by the need to respect the ZLB)21 implies
excessive output and interest rate volatility relative to the case of the Ramsey policy.
Across all alternative policies, the welfare costs of failing to implement the Ramsey policy
are greatest in the case of deep habits.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we considered the optimal policy response to technology shocks in a New
Keynesian economy subject to habits e¤ects in consumption. When these e¤ects were as-
sumed to be external, one household fails to take account of the impact their consumption
behavior has on other households, as each household seeks to catch up with the Joneses.
20Similar results are reported for the comparable calibration in Table 1 of Amato and Laubach (2004)
who also consider optimal commitment policy in a sticky price economy with internal habits and a ZLB
problem.
21Under deep habits, a policy of strict ination targeting breaches the ZLB due to the volatility of
interest rates used to achieve the target. We account for this in the numbers presented which explains
why the strict ination target is not actually achieved.
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This consumption externality needs to be traded-o¤ against the monetary policy makers
usual desire to stabilize ination (a trade-o¤ which we demonstrated would not exist if
habits were internal) and generates a new form of stabilization bias, as time consistent
policy is unable to mimic the initial policy response under commitment. This framework
is further enriched by allowing the habits e¤ects to be either supercial (at the level of the
households total consumption) or deep (at the level of individual consumption goods).
Under deep habits, rms face dynamic demand curves which imply an intertemporal di-
mension to price setting and endogenous mark-up behavior, beyond that associated with
price stickiness. In both cases, but particularly under deep habits due to the enhanced
dynamic price setting behavior, the policy maker does not cut interest rates in response
to a positive technology shock to the extent required to mimic the ex-price allocation,
as they wish to mitigate the undesirable habits formation that would otherwise arise.
In addition to considering optimal policy, we also analyzed the stabilizing properties
of simple rules. We investigate the determinacy properties of such rules and nd that
supercial habits e¤ects tend to increase the range of parameters consistent with deter-
minacy, provided the Taylor principle is satised. However, for su¢ ciently large measures
of deep habits (which fall within the range of econometric estimates) the Taylor principle
ceases to be either a necessary or su¢ cient condition for determinacy. We demonstrate
that optimally parameterized determinate simple implementable rules can typically come
close to achieving the welfare levels observed under optimal commitment policy. More-
over, the optimal parameters within the simple rules are highly dependent on the degree
of habits and vary in a manner consistent with the reduced emphasis on ination stabi-
lization and the increasing concern with the habits externality, observed as the degree of
habits increases. Overall, our work suggests that the choice of internal or external habits
e¤ects will have non-trivial implications for optimal policy, even if the implied dynamics
of the model when policy is described by an ad-hoc rule could be similar (Kozicki and
Tinsley (2002)).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commitment
policy : internal habits (pluses) and external habits: supercial (solid lines) and deep (dash
lines).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commitment
policy, with deep habits:  = 0:4 (solid lines),  = 0:6 (benchmark value, dash lines),
 = 0:8 (circles).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of supercial
habits under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash
lines).
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of deep habits
under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash lines).
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Figure 6: Determinacy properties of the model with supercial habits, when monetary
policy follows the rule bRt = bt + y bYt + R bRt 1: determinacy (light grey dots), inde-
terminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
29
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0 and f
R
 =1.1
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.4 and f
R
 =1.1
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.7 and fR =1.1
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.8 and f
R
 =1.1
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.9 and f
R
 =1.1
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0 and f
R
 =0.9
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.4 and f
R
 =0.9
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.7 and fR =0.9
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.8 and f
R
 =0.9
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.9 and f
R
 =0.9
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0 and f
R
 =0.5
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.4 and f
R
 =0.5
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.7 and fR =0.5
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.8 and f
R
 =0.5
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.9 and f
R
 =0.5
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0 and f
R
 =0
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.4 and f
R
 =0
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.7 and fR =0
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.8 and f
R
 =0
f
p
f y
-10 0 10
-10
0
10
q =0.9 and f
R
 =0
f
p
f y
Figure 7: Determinacy properties of the model with deep habits, when monetary policy
follows the rule bRt = 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(blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with su-
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cial habits with  = 0:6, under the optimal Taylor rule (dash lines) and optimal
commitment policy (solid lines).
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Figure 9: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of supercial habits.
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Technical Appendix - Not for Inclusion in Journal.
A Analytical Details
A.1 Households
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption basket
to minimize expenditures
min
fCkitgi
Z 1
0
PitC
k
itdi
s:t:
Z 1
0

Ckit   Cit 1
  1

di
 
 1
 Xkt
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =

Pit
Pt
 
Xkt + Cit 1;
where Pt is the overall price level, expressed as an aggregate of the good i prices, Pt =R 1
0 P
1 
it di
 1
1 
:
Utility Maximization The solution to the utility maximization problem is ob-
tained by solving the Lagrangian function,
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
h
u

Xkt ; N
k
t

  kt

PtX
k
t + Pt#t +Qt;t+1D
k
t+1  WtNkt (1  ) Dkt   t   Tt
i
:
In the budget constraint, we have re-expressed the total spending on the consumption
basket,
R 1
0 PitC
k
itdi, in terms of quantities that a¤ect the households utility,Z 1
0
PitC
k
itdi = PtX
k
t + Pt#t;
where under deep habits #t is given as #t  
R 1
0

Pit
Pt

Cit 1di, while under supercial
habits it takes the simpler form, #t  Ct 1. Households take #t as given when maximiz-
ing utility.
The rst order conditions are then, 
Xkt

: uX(t) = 
k
tPt 
Nkt

:  uN (t) = uX(t) WtPt (1  ) 
Dkt

: 1 = Et
h
uX(t+1)
uX(t)
Pt
Pt+1
i
Rt
33
where Rt = 1Et[Qt;t+1] is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds.
With utility given by u (X;N) = X
1 
1    N
1+
1+ , the rst derivatives are
uX () = X  and uN () =  N:
A.2 Firms
The cost minimization involves the choice of labor input Nit subject to the available
production technology
min
Nit
WtNit
s:t: AtNit = Yit
The minimization problem implies a labor demand, Nit = YitAt , and a nominal marginal
cost which is the same across all brand producing rms, MCt = (1  {) WtAt : Prots are
dened as:
it  PitYit  WtNit   '
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
PtYt
= (Pit  MCt)Yit   '
2

Pit
Pit 1
  1
2
PtYt
where the last term represents the nominal costs of adjusting prices, as in Rotemberg
(1982), and  is the steady state ination.
Each rm then chooses processes for Pit and Yit to maximize the present discounted
value of prots, under the restriction that all demand be satised at the chosen price
(Cit = Yit):
max
fPit; Yitg
Et
1X
s=0
Qt;t+sit+s = Et
1X
s=0
Qt;t+s
"
(Pit+s  MCt+s)Yit+s   '
2

Pit+s
Pit+s 1
  1
2
Pt+sYt+s
#
s:t:Yit+s =

Pit+s
Pt+s
 
Xt+s + Yit+s 1
Qt;t+s = 
s

Xt+s
Xt
  Pt
Pt+s
The rst order conditions are:
vit = (Pit  MCt) + Et [Qt;t+1vit+1]
and
Yit = vit
"


Pit
Pt
  1 Xt
Pt
#
+

'

Pit
Pit 1
  1

PtYt
Pit 1
  'EtQt;t+1

Pit+1
Pit
  1

Pit+1
 (Pit)
2Pt+1Yt+1

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where vit is the Lagrange multiplier on the dynamic demand constraint and represents
the shadow price of producing good i:
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B Equilibrium Conditions
B.1 Aggregation and Symmetry
Aggregate output: In this setup, all rms and all households are symmetric. This
implies that aggregate output is given by
Yt = AtNt
Aggregate resource constraint: Aggregate prots are
t = PtYt  WtNt   '
2
t

  1
2
PtYt
and the household budget constraint becomes in equilibrium (note: PtXt + Pt#t reduces
to PtCt)
PtCt =WtNt(1  ) + t + Tt
Combine the household budget constraint with the government budget constraint (WtNt = Tt)
and the denition of prots to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
Ct +
'
2
t

  1
2
Yt = Yt
B.2 System of Non-linear Equations
Xt = Ct   Ct 1 (32)
Nt X

t =
Wt
Pt
 wt(1  ) (33)
X t = Et

X t+1 Rt
 1
t+1

(34)
Yt = !tXt + '
t

  1
 t

Yt   'Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
  t+1

  1
 t+1

Yt+1
#
(35)
!t =

1  1
t

+ Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
 
!t+1
#
(36)
Yt = AtNt (37)
Yt = Ct +
'
2
t

  1
2
Yt (38)
mct =
wt
At
(39)
t =
1
mct
(40)
lnAt =  lnAt 1 + t (41)
36
B.3 The Deterministic Steady State
The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables and
nominal variables growing at a constant rate. The equilibrium conditions (32) - (41)
reduce to:
X = (1  )C (42)
NX = w(1  ) (43)
1 = 
 
R 1

= r (44)
Y = !X (45)
 = [1  (1  )!] 1 (46)
Y = AN (47)
Y = C (48)
mc =
w
A
(49)
 =
1
mc
A = 1
Table 1 contains the imposed calibration restrictions. We assume values for the real
interest rate, the Frisch labor supply elasticity, steady state ination, and the parameters
; , ', and . The discount factor  matches the assumed real rate of interest,  = r 1,
while the nominal interest rate is R = r. Given the specication of the utility function,
 is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, Nw = 1 .
With no price adjustment costs in the deterministic steady state, C = Y: Then, using
equations (42) and (45), the steady state value of the shadow price ! is
! = [ (1  )] 1 ;
while the markup  is given by equation (46) and the marginal cost is its inverse, mc =
 1.
To determine the steady state value of labor, we substitute for X in terms of Y in (43)
and then, using the aggregate production function, we obtain the following expression,
N+ [(1  )A] = w(1  ); (50)
which can be solved for N . Note that this expression depends on the real wage w, which
can be obtained from equation (49). However, in order to assess the level of taxation
needed to make the long-run equilibrium e¢ cient, we substitute for real wages using the
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steady-state condition for marginal costs, mc = w=A = 1=
N+ [(1  )A] = A

(1  ); (51)
In order for this condition to match the social planners allocation (65) it must be the
case that  = 1    (1  ). See Appendix E for the social planners problem. Finally,
equations (47) and (42) can be solved for aggregate output Y (or consumption C) and
habit-adjusted consumption X.
B.4 System of Log-linear Equations
Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (32) - (41) around the e¢ cient deterministic
steady state gives the following set of equations:
bXt = (1  ) 1  bCt    bCt 1
 bXt +  bNt = bwtbXt = Et bXt+1   1

 bRt   Etbt+1
bYt = b!t + bXt + ' (bt   Etbt+1) (52)
b!t = 1
!
bt + Etb!t+1 +   bXt   Et bXt+1 (53)
bYt = bAt + bNtbYt = bCt
cmct = bwt   bAt
bt =  cmctbAt =  bAt 1 + "t
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is given by the pricing equation (52)
bt = Etbt+1 + 1
'
bYt   b!t   bXt
where the evolution of the shadow value b!t is given by equation (53).
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C The Case of Supercial External Habits
C.1 Households
Habits are supercialwhen they are formed at the level of the aggregate consumption
good. Households derive utility from the habit-adjusted composite good Xkt ,
Xkt = C
k
t   Ct 1;
where household ks consumption, Ckt ; is an aggregate of a continuum of nal goods,
indexed by i 2 [0; 1] ;
Ckt =
Z 1
0

Ckit
  1

di
 
 1
;
with  > 1 the elasticity of substitution between them and Ct 1 
R 1
0 C
k
t 1dk the cross-
sectional average of consumption.
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption basket
to minimize expenditures
min
fCkitgi
Z 1
0
PitC
k
itdi
s:t:
Z 1
0

Ckit
  1

di
 
 1
 Ckt :
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =

Pit
Pt
 
Ckt ;
where Pt 
R 1
0 P
1 
it di
 1
1 
is the consumer price index. The overall demand for good i
is obtained by aggregating across all households
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk =

Pit
Pt
 
Ct: (54)
Unlike in the case of deep habits, this demand is not dynamic.
C.2 Firms
The rmscost minimization problem is unchanged, while the prot maximization is still
dynamic (due to the nature of price inertia) but subject to the static demand (54). The
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price is set optimally to satisfy the following relationship:
1  

1  1
t

Yt = '
t

  1
 t

Yt   'Et
"
Xt+1
Xt
  t+1

  1
 t+1

Yt+1
#
:
(55)
C.3 Equilibrium
In this setup, we obtain the familiar looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
bt = Etbt+1 +    1
'
cmct (56)
to which we add the IS curve,
bXt = Et bXt+1   1

bRt + 1

Etbt+1; (57)
and two equations dening the habit-adjusted consumption and the real marginal cost,
bXt = 1
1  
bYt   bYt 1 (58)
cmct =  bXt + bYt   (1 + ) bAt: (59)
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D The Case of Internal Habits
D.1 Households
Habits are internal and supercial when they are formed at the level of the aggregate
consumption bundle but households endogenize the e¤ects of their current consumption
choices on future utility. Each household k derives utility from a habit-adjusted composite
good Xkt ,
Xkt = C
k
t   Ckt 1
where Ckt is the time-t aggregate of a continuum of goods, indexed by i 2 [0; 1] ;
Ckt =
Z 1
0

Ckit
  1

di
 
 1
with  > 0 the elasticity of substitution between them, and Ckt 1 is the previous period
consumption of household k. Since households are symmetric and, in this case, we also
do not need to distinguish between individual and aggregate variables, in what follows we
drop the k superscript.
Cost Minimization The households cost minimization problem yields a typical
static demand for each good i;
Cit =

Pit
Pt
 
Ct
where Pt 
R 1
0 P
1 
it di
 1
1 
.
Utility maximization The Lagrangian function is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
" 
(Ct   Ct 1)1 
1    
N1+t
1 + 
!
  t (PtCt + EtQt;t+1Dt+1  WtNt(1  ) Dt   t   Tt)
#
where Rt = 1Et[Qt;t+1] is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds. Anticipat-
ing that current consumption decisions a¤ect the stock of habits entering into the future,
the consumption Euler equation is given by,
X t   EtX t+1 = Et
 
X t+1   Et+1X t+2
 Rt
t+1

and the labor supply condition by,
(Nt)
 
X t   EtX t+1
 = wt(1  )
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In log-linear form, the rst order condition for labor and the Euler equation become
 bNt = bwt   
1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1 (60)
and bXt   Et bXt+1 = Et  bXt+1   Et+1 bXt+2  1  

 bRt   Etbt+1 (61)
D.2 Firms
The rmsbehavior is unchanged, except that the stochastic discount factor in their prot
maximization problem is given by,
Qt;t+s = 
s

t+s
t

= s
 
X t+s   Et+sX t+s+1
X t   EtX t+1
!
Pt
Pt+s
and the rmsFOC for price is then
[1   (1 mct)]Yt = '
t

  1
 t

Yt 'Et
" 
X t+1   Et+1X t+2
X t   EtX t+1
!t+1

  1
 t+1

Yt+1
#
In a deterministic steady state, this relationship still reduces to 1 =  (1 mc) ; and
the log-linearized equation, which is essentially the NKPC, is the same as under external
supercial habits.
The marginal cost relationship is slightly modied due to the di¤erent marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labor:
cmct = bwt   bAt
=


1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1+  bNt  bAt
=

1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1+ bYt   (1 + ) bAt (62)
Hence, the system of relevant equations includes the IS curve (61), the NKPC (56), the
marginal cost relationship (62), and the usual denition of the habit-adjusted consumption
(58).
In gap form
In the case of internal habits, it is easy to write these relationships in gapform. LetbY gt  bYt  bY t and bXgt  bXt  bXt denote the relevant gapvariables. Using the equations
describing the social planners allocation below, the marginal cost equation can be written
42
as
cmct = 
1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1+ bYt   (1 + ) bAt
=

1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1+ bYt   
1  
 bXt   Et bXt+1  bY t
=

1  
h bXt   bXt   Et  bXt+1   bXt+1i+  bYt   bY t 
=

1  
 bXgt   Et bXgt+1+ bY gt
and the NKPC is then,
bt = Etbt+1 +    1
'


1  
 bXgt   Et bXgt+1+ bY gt  (63)
The IS curve can also be written using gap variables and additional terms involving
only the social planners allocation. From the social planners problem, bXt  Et bXt+1 =
1 

h
(1 + ) bAt   bY t i, which then allows us to write the IS curve as (add and subtract
the time t and (t+ 1) expressions from the LHS and RHS of the IS equation):
bXgt   Et bXgt+1 =
8>><>>:
Et
 bXgt+1   Et+1 bXgt+2  1   bRt   Etbt+1
+1 
h
(1 + ) (  1) bAt    Et bY t+1   bY t i
9>>=>>;
D.3 Optimal Policy: internal habits
In the case of internal (supercial) habits, we can show analytically that in response to
technology shocks the Ramsey planner can set the nominal interest rate so as to match
the social planners allocation, without creating ination. Using the link between gap
variables, bXgt = 11  bY gt   bY gt 1, we rst express all relevant equations in terms of
ination and output gap. The welfare function  0 is
 0 =  1
2

E0
1X
t=0
t


bY gt   bY gt 12 +  bY gt 2 + 'b2t+ tip+O[2]
and the New Keynesian Phillips curve (63) is
bt = Etbt+1      1
'

h
Et bY gt+1    bY gt + bY gt 1i (64)
where 
, ; and  are dened as: 
  N1+,   (1 )(1 ) , and  
 
1 + 2 + 

.
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With the IS curve not binding, the Lagrangian is
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
8><>:  
1
2



bY gt   bY gt 12 + bY gt + 'b2t
 t
hbt   bt+1 +  1'  Et bY gt+1    bY gt + bY gt 1i
9>=>;
and the rst order conditions for the output gap and ination are:bY gt  :  bY gt      1'
 t

= Et
bY gt+1      1'
 t+1

+ 
bY gt 1      1'
 t 1

(bt) : bt =   1
'

 
t   t 1

with the additional restriction that, under full commitment, the central bank ignores
past commitments in the rst period and sets all pre-existing conditions to zero, bY g 1 =
 1 = 0. By varying interest rates to eliminate the output gap, the value of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the NKPC is zero, t = 0, and the policy maker can achieve the
exible-price allocation which is desirable since there are no frictions other than nominal
inertia in this economy featuring internal habits.
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E The Social Planners Problem
The subsidy level that ensures an e¢ cient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing
the steady state solution of the social planners problem with the steady state obtained in
the decentralized equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other
ine¢ ciencies and chooses real allocations that maximize the representative consumers
utility subject to the aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production function,
and the law of motion for habit-adjusted consumption:
max
fXt ;Ct ;Nt g
E0
1X
t=0
tu (Xt ; N

t )
s:t: Y t = C

t
Y t = AtN

t
Xt = C

t   Ct 1
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between labor and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
 (Nt )

(Xt )
  = At
"
1  Et

Xt+1
Xt
 #
:
The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as,
 (N)+ [(1  )A] = A (1  ) : (65)
The dynamics of this model are driven by technology shocks to the system of equilib-
rium conditions composed of the Euler equation, the resource constraint, and the evolution
of habit-adjusted consumption. In log-linear form, these are:
bXt = Et bXt+1 + 1     bNt + bAt
bY t = bAt + bNt
bXt = 11   bY t   bY t 1 ;
which combined yield the following dynamic equation
 bY t = Et bY t+1 + bY t 1 + 1 + 
 bAt
where    1 + 2 +   and   (1 )(1 ) . In the absence of deep habits,  = 0, the
model reduces to the basic New Keynesian model where bY t =  1++ bAt.
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F Derivation of Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
X1 t
1    
N1+t
1 + 
where Xt = Ct   Ct 1 is the habit-adjusted aggregate consumption. Before considering
the elements of the utility function, we need to note the following general result relating
to second order approximations
Yt   Y
Yt
= bYt + 1
2
bY 2t +O[2]
where bYt = ln  YtY  and O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the
bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places in the
derivation of welfare. Now consider the second order approximation to the rst term,
X1 t
1   = X
1 

Xt  X
X

  
2
X
1 

Xt  X
X
2
+ tip+O[2]
where tip represents terms independent of policy. Using the results above this can be
rewritten in terms of hatted variables
X1 t
1   = X
1 
 bXt + 1
2
(1  ) bX2t + tip+O[2]:
In pure consumption terms, the value of Xt can be approximated to second order by:
bXt = 1
1  
 bCt + 1
2
bC2t   1  
 bCt 1 + 1
2
bC2t 1  12 bX2t +O[2]
To a rst order, bXt = 1
1  
bCt   
1  
bCt 1 +O[1]
which implies bX2t = 1(1  )2  bCt    bCt 12 +O[2]
Therefore,
X1 t
1   = X
1 

1
1  
 bCt + 1
2
bC2t   1  
 bCt 1 + 1
2
bC2t 1+ 12 ( ) bX2t

+ tip+O[2]
Summing over the future,
1X
t=0
t
X1 t
1   = X
1 
1X
t=0
t

1  
1  
 bCt + 1
2
bC2t   12 bX2t

+ tip+O[2]:
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The term in labour supply can be written as
N1+t
1 + 
= N
1+
 bNt + 1
2
(1 + ) bN2t + tip+O[2]
Now we need to relate the labor input to output which, in this case without price
dispersion, is simply,
Nt =
Yt
At
and can be approximated to rst order,
bNt = bYt   bAt
which implies bN2t = bYt   bAt2
so we can then write
N1+t
1 + 
= N
1+
bYt + 1
2
(1 + ) bY 2t   (1 + ) bYt bAt+ tip+O[2]
Welfare is then given by
 0 = X
1 
E0
1X
t=0
t

1  
1  
 bCt + 1
2
bC2t   12X^2t

 N1+E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt + 1
2
(1 + ) bY 2t   (1 + ) bYt bAt
+tip+O[2]
From the social planners problem we know, X
 
(1 ) = N such that X1 (1 ) =
(1   )N1+. If we use the appropriate subsidy to render the steady-state e¢ cient and
also use the second order approximation to the national accounting identity,
bCt + 1
2
bC2t = bYt + 12 bY 2t   '2 b2t +O[2];
we can eliminate the level terms and write the sum of discounted utilities as:
 0 =  1
2
N
1+
E0
1X
t=0
t
(
 (1  )
1  
bX2t + bYt   1 +  bAt
2
+ 'b2t
)
+ tip+O[2] (66)
The welfare function can be also expressed in the usual gap form. To do so, we
employ the social planners solution in log-linear form to re-write the output term in the
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welfare function as,

bYt   1 + 

bAt2 =  bYt   bY t 2 + 2 1   bYt  bXt   Et bXt+1+ tip
Summing across time periods, we have
E0
1X
t=0
t
bYt   1 + 

bAt2 = E0 1X
t=0
t


bYt   bY t 2   2 1   bYt  bXt   Et bXt+1

+tip+O [2]
Then note that we can write
bX2t =  bXt   bXt 2 + 2 bXt bXt    bXt 2
and, keeping only the terms relevant for policy, the welfare function becomes,
 0 =  1
2
N
1+
E0
1X
t=0
t
8>>><>>>:
(1 )
1 
 bXt   bXt 2 + 2(1 )1  bXt bXt +  bYt   bY t 2
 2 1  bYt  bXt   Et bXt+1+ 'b2t
9>>>=>>>;+tip+O[2]
Finally, we can show that
E0
1X
t=0
t

1  
bYt  bXt   Et bXt+1 =
"
E0
1X
t=0
t
 (1  )
1  
bXt bXt
#
+ tip
which allows to write the welfare function in gap form as follows
 0 =  1
2
N
1+
E0
1X
t=0
t

 (1  )
1  
 bXt   bXt 2 +  bYt   bY t 2 + 'b2t+ tip+O[2]
F.1 Welfare Measure
We measure welfare as the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility, approximated as
W = E
1X
t=0
tu (Xt; Nt)
=
1
1  

u+
1
2
h 
C + C 1

var
bYt+ 2CC 1 cov bYt; bYt 1+ Nvar  bNt+ var (bt)i
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with u the steady-state level of the momentary utility and the  coe¢ cients dened as8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
C  11 

1  1 

X
1 
C 1    1 

1 + 1 

X
1 
CC 1  (1 )2X
1 
and
8><>:
N    (1 + )N1+
   'X1 
The welfare terms associated with the Ramsey policy that are involved in computing
the welfare costs of alternative policies, as in expression (28) in the text, are given by,
WRX = E
1X
t=0
t
 
XRt
1 
1  
=
1
1  
( 
X
1 
1   +
1
2
h 
C + C 1

var
bY Rt + 2CC 1 cov bY Rt ; bY Rt 1+ var bRt i
)
and
WRN =  E
1X
t=0
t
 
NRt
1+
1 + 
=
1
1  
(
 
 
N
1+
1 + 
+
1
2
Nvar
 bNRt 
)
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G Optimal Policy: Commitment
Upon substitution of the habit-adjusted consumption term, the central banks objective
function becomes
1
2

E0
1X
t=0
t
h
( + ) bY 2t   2bYt bYt 1 + 2bY 2t 1   2 (1 + ) bYt bAt + 'b2t i
where 
  N1+ and   (1 )(1 ) and we re-write the constraints as,
1 + 
1  
 bYt = 1
1  Et
bYt+1 + 1

Etbt+1 + 
1  
bYt 1   1

bRt
bt = Etbt+1   2 bYt + 2 bYt 1   1b!t
!b!t = !Etb!t+1   1Et bYt+1 + 2 bYt + 3 bYt 1 + (1 + ) bAt
where
8><>:
1  1'
2  1 1 
and
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1  ! 1 
2  1 (1 + ) 


1  + 

3  1  (1  !)
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
2

h
  ( + ) bY 2t + 2bYt bYt 1   2bY 2t 1 + 2 (1 + ) bYt bAt   'b2t i
 t
h
1+
1 
 bYt   11  bYt+1   1bt+1   1  bYt 1 + 1 bRti
  t
hbt   bt+1 + 2 bYt   2 bYt 1 + 1b!ti
 &t
h
!b!t   !Etb!t+1 + 1Et bYt+1   2 bYt   3 bYt 1   (1 + ) bAti
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
The government chooses paths for bRt, bYt, bt, and b!t. The rst order condition with
respect to the nominal interest rate gives:
  1E0tt = 0; 8t  0 (67)
which implies that the IS curve is not binding and it can therefore be excluded from the
optimization problem. Once the optimal rules for the other variables have been obtained,
we use the IS curve to determine the path of the nominal interest rate. So, the central
bank now chooses
nbYt; bt; b!to. The Lagrangian takes the form:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t
8>>><>>>:
1
2

h
  ( + ) bY 2t + 2bYt bYt 1   2bY 2t 1 + 2 (1 + ) bYt bAt   'b2t i
  t
hbt   bt+1 + 2 bYt   2 bYt 1 + 1b!ti
 &t
h
!b!t   !Etb!t+1 + 1Et bYt+1   2 bYt   3 bYt 1   (1 + ) bAti
9>>>=>>>; :
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The rst order condition for the shadow value b!t gives the relationship between the two
Lagrange multipliers,
1 t =  ! (&t   &t 1)
while for ination we have the rather usual expression
bt =   1
'

 
 t    t 1

:
The rst order condition for output gives
 
 bYt+
bYt 1+
(1 + ) bAt 2 t+2&t 1&t 1+Et h
bYt+1 + 2 t+1 + 3&t+1i = 0
where, as dened before,    1 + 2 +  .
Under full commitment, the central bank ignores past commitments in the rst period
by setting all pre-existing conditions to zero, bY 1 = 0 and   1 = & 1 = 0. To nd the
solution, solve the system of equations composed of the rst order conditions, the three
constraints, and the technology process.
G.1 Optimal Policy: Discretion
In order to solve the time-consistent policy problem we employ the iterative algorithm of
Soderlind (1999), which follows Currie and Levine (1993) in solving the Bellman equation.
The per-period objective function can be written in matrix form as Z 0tQZt, where Zt+1 =h bAt+1 bYt Et bYt+1 Etb!t+1 Etbt+1 i0 and
Q =
1
2


26666664
0 0   (1 + ) 0 0
0 2   0 0
  (1 + )   ( + ) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 '
37777775
and the structural description of the economy is given by,
Zt+1 = AZt +But + t+1;
where ut =
h bRti, t+1 = h "At+1 0 0 0 0 i0, A  A 10 A1; B  A 10 B0,
A0 =
26666664
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 11  0 
 1
0 0 0 0 
37777775 ; A1 =
26666664
 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 +  3 2  ! 0
0   1  1+1  0 0
0  2 2 1 1
37777775
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and
B0 =
h
0 0 0  1 0
i0
:
This completes the description of the required inputs for Soderlind (1999)s Matlab code
which computes optimal discretionary policy.
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Figure 11: Determinacy properties of the model with internal habits, when monetary
policy follows the rule bRt = bt + y bYt + R bRt 1: determinacy (light grey dots), inde-
terminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 12: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of supercial habits, the
unconstrained case.
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Figure 13: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of deep habits, the uncon-
strained case.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with deep
habits with  = 0:6, under the optimal Taylor rule (dash lines) and optimal commitment
policy (solid lines).
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